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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of the Estate
of Katherine Wentland Gorrell,
Deceased,

]
]
]

v.

]>

Robert E. Gorrell,

]

Appellant.

Case No.

860113-CA

]

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to the terms of Rule 35, of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals, respondent, First Security Bank of Utah,
N. A., hereinafter ("First Security11) petitions the Court for a
rehearing of the decision entered on July 27, 1987.

In support

of this petition, First Security respectfully submits that the
Court's July 27th decision, namely, to award appellant all of
the $43,700.00, is not supported by the facts in evidence, is
contrary to the findings of the trial court, and in effect
improperly finds the $43,700.00 to be joint tenancy property.
ARGUMENT
This Court in reversing the lower court's decision has
not only ruled that the $43,700.00 was not the sole property of
the estate of Katherine Gorrell, but has apparently ruled that
the $43,700.00 is the sole property of the appellant.
The facts of this case do not support such a result.
The parties stipulated at the commencement of the
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hearing and appellant testified that prior to finding the
$43,700.00, appellant had no knowledge of the money's existence.
Appellant testified that on the same day that decedent
died, he went in to rearrange the cupboards in the kitchen and
found approximately $43,700.00 in a heart shaped beauty box in
a blue agate roasting pan

(Tr - 35 and 4 6 ) . Appellant also

testified that he had never done any cooking as long as he was
married to Katherine Gorrell (Tr - 35).
During the trial, appellant testified that Katherine
Gorrell was the only one that knew where the money came from
(Tr - 36). Appellant, respondent and the trial court all
agreed that the $43,700.00 found in Mrs. Gorrell's home had
been in her sole possession and control at the time of her
death.
Respondent acknowledges that a finding that the money
was in Mrs. Gorrellfs exclusive possession does not establish
where the money came from.

On the issue of where the money

came from, the trial judge found three equally plausible
alternatives:
1.

Mrs. Gorrell saved the money from Mr. Gorrell's

2.

Mrs. Gorrell saved the money prior to the marriage.

3.

The savings consisted of moneys from both Mr. and

earnings.

Mrs. Gorrell (Tr - 111).
No matter which scenario this Court or any court
accepts, it is important to note that Mrs. Gorrell did the
saving and that Mrs. Gorrell had an interest in the money saved.
-2-

During the Gorrellfs marriage, Mrs. Gorrell was the
business manager and handled all of the money (Tr -37-40).

She

did the cooking and she took care of Mr. Gorrell through all of
his medical problems which, as Mr. Gorrell testified, was no
easy job for a woman her age (Tr -27).
Respondent was at an enormous disadvantage during the
trial of this case in that respondent's key witness, the
witness that knew the source of the $43,700.00, was dead and
unable to testify.

The trial court heard the full side of Mr.

Gorrellfs story and only fragments of Mrs. Gorrellfs story.

In

spite of that fact, the trial judge found from the evidence
that he did not know the source of the money.

By reversing the

trial court, respondent contends that this Court has made a
factual finding that the money belonged to appellant.
POINT I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT
SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THIS APPELLATE COURT.
In the case of Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651
(Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme Court:
The standard for appellate review of factual
findings affords great difference to the trial
court's view of the evidence unless the trial
court has misapplied the law or its findings are
clearly against the weight of the evidence.
And in First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., vs. Hall,
supra, that court stated:
As this court has stated in numerous prior
decisions, we will not disturb the findings of
the trial court unless the court has misapplied
proven facts or made findings clearly against the
weight of evidence.
-3-

The trial court did not make a finding in this case
that the $43,700.00 belonged to Mr. Gorrell.

This Court has

ruled that the lower court improperly placed the burden of
proof in this case on Mr. Gorrell.

Respondent contends that

once the court has made that finding the case should either be
remanded for further findings by the lower court or the Appeals
Court should apply the law within the factual finding already
made by the trial court.
In the instant case, respondent fails to understand
how appellant could be deemed to be the sole owner of the
discovered money under the facts presented to the lower court.
POINT II.

NO JOINT TENANCY OWNERSHIP EXISTED IN THE
$43,700.00

The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Neill v. Royce,
120 P2d 327 (1942) held that absent the designation of joint
tenancy the law favored a finding of tenancy in common.

The

court stated:
The historical background of a joint tenancy
has an interesting and fluctuating record. In
the early English common law the general rule was
that in the absence of an express provision
severing the interests, a transfer of estates was
deemed by law a joint tenancy at this early time
for the reason that a tenancy in common tended to
split the feudal tenures, thus rendering it
difficult to collect these feudal military
services. . . .
When the military tenures were abolished and
converted into free and common socage by the
statute 12 Chas. II, (1660) C. 24, Sec. 1, the
reason for such presumption of joint tenancy
ceased to exist. . . . Hence, in the absence of
express words to the contrary, the presumption of
the law reversed itself from presuming a joint
tenancy to favoring and presuming a tenancy in
common.
-4-

Utah Code Annotated 57-1-5 (1953 as amended) states:
Every interest in real estate granted to two or
more persons in their own right shall be a
tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in
the grant to be otherwise. Use of words lfjoint
tenancy11 or "with rights of survivorship11 or "and
to the survivor of them11 or words of similar
import shall declare a joint tenancy. A sole
owner of real property shall create a joint
tenancy in himself and another or others by
making a transfer to himself and such other or
others as joint tenants by use of such words as
herein provided or by conveying to another person
or persons an interest in land in which an
interest is retained by the grantor and by
declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use
of such words as herein provided. In all cases
the interest of joint tenants must be equal and
undivided.
Although this statute covers only real property, the
legislature, consistent with Neill v. Royce, supra, has
expressed a preference for tenancy in common, unless the ownership is expressly declared to be otherwise.
In order for a joint tenancy to exist, it has long
been recognized that a unity of time, title, possession and
interest must exist.

20 Am Jur 2d P. 96, Cotenancy and Joint

Ownership §4
In the case before this court, whether there was a
unity of time is unknown because we do not know the source of
the money.

However, the unities of title, possession and

interest do not exist where appellant does not know where the
money came from (Tr - 35-36), and agrees that the decedent did
know.

Appellant could have no unity of title, possession or

interest in property, the very existence of which he knew
nothing about, where the decedent possessed and controlled the
-5-

money during her lifetime.
A joint tenancy ownership of the $43,700.00 cannot be
found in this case absent a written expression to that effect
or facts sufficient to support a joint tenancy.

If this court

finds that a joint tenancy ownership of the $43,700.00 did not
exist at the time of the decedent's death, then it seems only
logical to respondent that the court would find that the money
was owned by the Gorrells as tenants in common.

If the money

was owned by the Gorrells as tenants in common, then one-half
of the money belonged to Mr. Gorrell and the other half
belonged to the estate.
CONCLUSION
The First Security Bank, as personal representative of
the Gorrell estate, had no choice in this case but to argue
that the $43,700.00 should have been included in the decedent's
estate.

The decedent was survived by not only a husband but by

three children of a prior marriage.

Those three children

together with First Security Bank believed earnestly that the
$43,700.00 or some portion thereof should have been included in
the estate because Mr. Gorrell had no knowledge of the
existence of the money prior to Mrs. Gorrell's death.

All

parties to this action have respected Mr. Gorrellfs honesty in
coming forward with the fact that he had discovered the money
and knew nothing about its existence prior to that discovery.
Absent such a declaration by Mr. Gorrell, this case would not
be pending before this Court.
-6-

In this case, in order for this Court or the trial
court to award all of the money to Mr. Gorrell, it must find
that Mr. Gorrell owned the money at the time of Mrs. Gorrellfs
death.
Ownership of money could be established by
possession.

54 Am Jur 2d 554, Money §6.

If possession is the

test of ownership in this case, the estate should prevail,
where the lower court specifically found that Mrs. Gorrell was
in control and possession of the money at the time of her death.
If possession alone is insufficient to establish
ownership, then respondent can only assume that this Court is
attempting to determine ownership by looking to the source of
the money.

The trial court, after considering all of the

evidence in the case and the demeanor of the witnesses, found
that although several possibilities existed as to the source of
the money, it was unable to determine the moneys source.
Unless this Court first determines that the trial court
misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly against the
weight of evidence, then it must also so find.
The money that was possessed and controlled by Mrs.
Gorrell was not in joint tenancy.

Respondent contends that if

it was not joint tenancy property and was not proven to be Mr.
Gorrellfs money, then it should not be awarded to him.
Respondent contends further that the money should
either be divided equally as cotenancy property or at the very
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least this case should be remanded to the trial court for a
further factual finding as to the ownership of the money.
DATED this

/^^Siay of August, 1987.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

lichael J. Giasmann
Attorneys 'for Respondent, First
Security Bank of Utah, N. A.
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
Pursuant to the terms of Rule 35 (a) of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals, Michael J. Glasmann, as counsel for
respondent petitioner, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A.,
hereby certifies that the foregoing Petition For Rehearing is
presented in good faith and not for delay,
DATED this /g^^ay of August, 1987.

-9-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that four copies of the foregoing
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